The Taliban and Strategic Containment ​_

The Taliban reportedly are making progress in taking control of more land in that poor Muslim nation surrounded by other poor Muslim nations. As the United States backs down it spending of billions and billions in that nation somewhat (instead of spending a 25 billion to build a border fence with Mexico) the tide of jihadist, radical Muslims that are fairly numerous increases. It costs quite a bit to buy allegiance in a nation that really hasn’t got the natural resources and personnel to keep the standard of living as high as would support westernization. Even worse, in 30 or 40 years there probably will still be tens or hundreds of millions of militant Muslims in that region of the world that is central Asia.

So the U.S.A. might want to consider the overly simplistic rationale of long term spending in Afghanistan to provide money sufficient to buy allegiance and create an artificial infrastructure that provides economic activity. The Taliban is quite tough on economic activity it regards as rival to its own Muslim ideas about economic activity and prefer a Muslim legal system too. Historically nations that spend too much on military concerns have damaged themselves even to the point of collapsing their civilization. Americans of course tend to take a simplistic or what-me-worry approach to foreign and domestic policy these days in the confidence that the ability of the Federal Reserve to provide free money to the rich and big banks is unlimited. The prime purpose of the economy and government of the U.S.A. in recent years has been to concentrate wealth and puff up the most rich so far as possible with little concern about the poor or middle class in fact if not in propaganda comprehensively.

The Taliban is regarded as too supportive of terrorist organizations that seek to attack the United States and Europe. Therefor the U.S.A. along with some N.A.T.O. forces believe it necessary to prevent the Taliban from returning to power in Afghanistan because they would allow terrorists to train and stage ops from that eagle’s nest. The strategic situation may be flexible somewhat, and certainly the tactics may be as well. I won’t write about either here more than nominally.

Two better policy opportunities for Afghanistan are building long-term strong U.S. base fortifications that would allow defense against jihadists for western military personnel at modest expense and creating some new form of ecological economic infrastructure for Afghanistan that would be difficult for the Taliban to destroy. Such a sustainable economy should be able to work with local resources as well as or better than poppy production. Each option (or both) would require a substantial element of intelligent thought that is innovative from U.S. policy planners-a very tall order in a society that traditionally prefers vast ordinance and expensive as a way to inefficiently over-power to victory.

Realistically the decadent drift of western society toward godless doctrine and homosexual marriage etc is likely to reinforce Taliban recruitment as well as that of other jihadist and mufsidoonist groups the next half century. Thus it would be a good idea to develop sustainable economic policy for Afghanistan that could exist without centralized, corrupting power that concentrates wealth and that makes the populous reliant upon the will and benevolence of the powerful in order to exist. That is a trans-cultural phenomenon of course.