Leaving the Strait of Hormuz Closed May be the Best Policy for the Trump Administration

(This post was edited by ChatGPT)

President Trump recently was rebuffed by Europeans who expressed unwillingness to defend Persian Gulf and Strait of Hormuz oil shipments bound for Europe and Asia. That refusal may unintentionally open several strategic possibilities.

In the philosophy of history it is often useful to remember that events do not occur in isolation. Political, economic, and military decisions form chains of causal reciprocity, where one decision alters the strategic environment and produces new consequences that feed back into other decisions. Energy policy, war, alliances, and historical memory frequently interact in such a reciprocal system.

The United States will probably continue to guarantee Europe freedom from massive nuclear attack from Russia, China, India, Pakistan, or any other nuclear power by maintaining the ability to retaliate against any state that devastates Europe. That nuclear guarantee—created during the Cold War through NATO—still functions even though the political circumstances that originally formed the alliance have evolved considerably.

Yet cooperation among allies against common threats has also historically depended upon shared political will. A nuclear-armed Iran capable of threatening Israel and potentially Europe itself would once have been considered a matter of joint concern.

Europe’s historical relationship with the Jewish people complicates this strategic environment. The continent that produced the catastrophe of The Holocaust under the regime of Adolf Hitler still struggles with the legacy of antisemitism, while contemporary European politics often shows strong public sympathy for Palestinian political claims. The wartime alliance between Nazi Germany and the Amin al-Husseini remains a historical reminder of how Middle Eastern and European politics have intersected before. At the same time, it must also be acknowledged that many Europeans strongly support Israel and reject antisemitism entirely. Europe’s political culture today is diverse and internally divided on these questions.

These historical and political currents influence present policy choices. If European governments are unwilling to defend Persian Gulf shipping routes, the United States might reconsider the broader structure of its geopolitical commitments.

One possibility would be a unilateral American decision to normalize relations with Russia in exchange for assurances that Russia will permanently remain on its own side of the Dnieper River. Such a settlement could accelerate the end of the Ukraine war and allow the global economy to stabilize.

Energy markets would then become part of the same reciprocal system of consequences. Russian, American, and Venezuelan oil exports to Asia cannot fully replace Persian Gulf production, but they could offset a substantial portion of it. In such circumstances, the United States might effectively allow the Persian Gulf and Strait of Hormuz to remain strategically closed for an extended period while alternative energy routes and markets develop.

Rerouting global oil supplies could stimulate construction of new pipelines and shipping networks. At the same time, higher energy prices would likely accelerate China’s already substantial investment in solar technology, strengthening its role as the world’s leading manufacturer of solar infrastructure.

In this way, the closure of a single maritime chokepoint could ripple outward through the entire global system—reshaping alliances, energy markets, technological development, and regional conflicts.

The Strait of Hormuz itself illustrates the structural vulnerability of the current world energy system. At its narrowest point the waterway is only about 21 miles wide, yet roughly 20 million barrels of oil per day—around one-fifth of global oil consumption—pass through this corridor on their way from Persian Gulf producers to international markets. The navigable shipping channels for massive tankers are even narrower, only a few miles wide in each direction. Such geographic compression concentrates an enormous portion of the world’s energy supply into a single, easily disrupted maritime chokepoint.

From a military and economic perspective this concentration is inherently dangerous. Any conflict involving Iran risks immediate disruption to a substantial share of global oil flows, which could produce rapid spikes in energy prices, inflation, and economic instability across the world. Because Iran controls the northern coastline of the strait, it is widely believed that Iranian military planning has long recognized this leverage and developed strategies designed to exploit the vulnerability of the chokepoint during a war with the United States or its allies.

Without Iranian cooperation, leaving the volatile Persian Gulf oil system partially closed might even become the most practical energy policy available. Destruction of Iran’s major oil export facilities could prevent Tehran from using the Strait of Hormuz for commercial purposes while also limiting its ability to finance regional ambitions.

Such actions would inevitably produce further reciprocal consequences inside Iran itself. Western intelligence agencies might pursue long-term support for Iranian political factions willing to restore non-sectarian civilian rule, attempting to prevent the country from collapsing into a prolonged post-war chaos similar to that experienced by Libya.

Europe could eventually decide to defend the Strait of Hormuz independently in order to restore Gulf oil exports once the United States has satisfied its strategic objectives and lost interest in maintaining naval dominance in the region.

Seen from the perspective of historical systems, these possibilities illustrate how international politics operates less like a sequence of isolated decisions and more like an interconnected web of reciprocal causes. A single refusal by allies to defend a shipping lane may ultimately reshape alliances, alter energy markets, influence wars, and accelerate technological transitions across the world.

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Energy Supply Note

Several analysts have noted that alternative oil sources could partially cushion disruptions in Persian Gulf supply but cannot fully replace it.

The Strait of Hormuz currently carries roughly 20 million barrels of oil per day, representing about one-fifth of global oil consumption and a large share of global seaborne oil trade. Because so much Gulf production depends on this route, any disruption can quickly affect global energy prices and supply chains. (Visual Capitalist)

If sanctions on Russia were lifted, a temporary increase in available supply could occur as stored or redirected Russian crude reached global markets. Estimates discussed in media reporting suggest that tens of millions of barrels of Russian oil currently stored or held offshore could re-enter the market relatively quickly, providing short-term relief to Asian importers such as China and India.

However, analysts broadly emphasize that this would be only a temporary cushion rather than a structural replacement for Persian Gulf production. The Persian Gulf region still contains a very large share of the world’s lowest-cost and most easily accessible oil reserves, which is difficult to replicate elsewhere.

Additional supply from the United States or Venezuela could help stabilize markets but faces logistical constraints. Shipping crude from the Western Hemisphere to Asia requires long maritime routes, whereas Russian exports benefit from direct pipeline connections to China.

As a result, even under optimistic assumptions, alternative producers could only partially offset a sustained disruption of Persian Gulf exports. In the long term, such disruptions might instead accelerate structural changes in global energy markets, including new pipelines, altered shipping routes, and faster adoption of alternative energy technologies.