Strait of Hormuz Tactics with Europe’s Age of Post WW 2, Post Cold War Self-Reliance

The crisis in the Strait of Hormuz has sharply highlighted Europe’s uncertain strategic position after the end of the Cold War. Many institutions and economic interests in both the United States and Europe had grown comfortable with the Cold War framework and were reluctant to see it end. Yet global circumstances have continued to evolve. President Trump, at least, appears to recognize the new configuration of national powers and the specific challenges it presents.

After the Second World War, Europe was in ruins—much like Ukraine today—with widespread destruction and heavy casualties. The Marshall Plan helped fund reconstruction, but recovery was neither quick nor simple. European militaries were weakened, and the Soviet Union immediately emerged as a major threat to the West. The Soviets, understandably, had no interest in a “catch and release” arrangement with a Western Europe that still contained Nazi sympathizers in several countries. Spain, for example, had already experienced a civil war that brought fascists to power.

After nearly half a century of communist occupation and supervision, the Eastern European nations under Soviet control were finally released at the end of the Cold War. To prevent any resurgence of fascism in Germany, the country was required to forgo certain weapons and military capabilities, even as former Nazis were gradually reintegrated. Several nations passed laws banning the advocacy of Nazi ideology, creating institutionalized restrictions on free speech. Some observers suggest the U.S. Democratic Party has modeled aspects of its approach to speech and thought control on this paradigm—labeling opponents as fascists, racists, or servants of authoritarian interests.

For nearly fifty years, Western Europe relied on the United States as the backbone of its military defense against communist expansion. NATO was created primarily to counter the Soviet threat. At the time, China was not yet a significant strategic concern; its communist revolution concluded in 1949, and it did not develop a nuclear weapon until 1964.

The Cold War became a global struggle against communist expansion. While Stalin had favored “socialism in one country,” after his death Soviet leadership shifted toward a more internationalist policy closer to Trotsky’s vision—one that Stalin had fiercely opposed. This shift fueled proxy wars, revolutions in Africa, the Vietnam conflict, and global terrorism. Over time, both the U.S. and the Soviet Union adopted Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) doctrines as their nuclear arsenals grew large enough to destroy civilization many times over.

Arms reduction talks and periods of détente followed. President Reagan famously urged Gorbachev to “tear down this wall.” Earlier, President Kennedy had visited Berlin and declared, “Ich bin ein Berliner.” As a World War II veteran, Kennedy understood the horrors of war. President Eisenhower had an even deeper grasp of global military strategy, though he was less informed about Iranian politics and history. He authorized the CIA to overthrow Iran’s elected constitutional government in 1953, fearing a communist takeover after Prime Minister Mossadegh nationalized British oil interests. That decision marked the beginning of long-term Iranian hostility toward the United States and helped set the stage for Iran’s later push to develop nuclear weapons.

Before the CIA-backed coup, the United States had actually enjoyed significant popularity in Iran, thanks in part to effective American economic advisers who had assisted the Iranian government.

When President Reagan, working with Mikhail Gorbachev, helped bring the Cold War to an end, many Western politicians were unprepared for the change. For a time, Reagan stood nearly alone in his administration in his desire for genuine peace with Russia and the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons. He was far ahead of his time. Even George H.W. Bush needed time to fully shift course and continue Reagan’s policy of engagement.

Europeans were understandably elated at the end of a divided continent. However, President Clinton—shaped by his Oxford background and limited grasp of Russian history—worked with Boris Yeltsin (an alcoholic leader famously seen running around the White House lawn in his underwear) in ways that contributed to the current Ukraine conflict. As some historians have noted, Russia was never going to permanently accept the complete loss of Ukraine and especially Crimea. A future reckoning was likely inevitable.

Twenty-five years after the Cold War’s end, Europe has used the Ukraine conflict as a lever to maintain military momentum, keep all of Ukraine under Western influence, and impose long-term sanctions on Russia. With the International Criminal Court based in Europe and European-led charges of war crimes against President Putin, sanctions are unlikely to end even if the fighting stops—unless Putin ends up in The Hague. The war has proven good business for some, and previous U.S. administrations provided full funding. It could have been ended earlier through diplomacy, allowing sanctions to lift and the global economy to normalize.

Europe clearly has different priorities regarding Ukraine than the United States. The U.S. largely wants the war to end and opposes indefinitely financing a Ukrainian regime that appears willing to risk escalation toward World War III. President Zelensky has already called for nuclear weapons, and some European nations have discussed allowing aircraft carrying nuclear arms into Ukraine. France, Britain, and Germany continue to supply weapons, intelligence, and advisers, while also targeting Russian oil infrastructure.

The United States, facing Iran’s nuclear ambitions, support for terrorism, and threats to Israel, is now engaged in conflict in the Persian Gulf region. Washington has asked Europe for support, noting that Europe (and Asia) also depend heavily on oil from the area. Europe has largely refused, even denying U.S. military aircraft use of their bases for Middle East operations. Since most of these nations are NATO members, their refusal effectively signals that the alliance—designed for the Cold War era—has become obsolete. European leaders now have different interests and threat assessments than they did between 1945 and 1989.

After losing most of its third-world colonies in the decades following World War II, Europe appears to have viewed a weakened post-Soviet Russia as an opportunity to establish new influence. President Clinton persuaded Yeltsin, as leader of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), to accept arrangements that detached Ukraine from Russia—despite Ukraine having been part of Russia before the 1917 Communist Revolution.

Europe has clearly recovered from its devastated post-World War II condition. It can now afford to fund its own militaries and no longer needs the United States as its primary defender against communism. Ironically, some European governments themselves exhibit tendencies that critics associate with creeping socialism or authoritarian control over speech and policy.

Rather than rigid, mechanical alliances like the current NATO structure, it may be wiser to develop flexible, tacit understandings based on mutual interests. The goal should be restoring healthy international relations, healing the global environment, reducing poverty, and protecting human rights and free speech worldwide.

Many observers remain concerned about German military rearmament and the possible development of advanced weapons systems, including traditional weapons of mass destruction.

President Trump is navigating this complex “three-ring circus” of global political and military challenges as the world moves beyond the old NATO framework. NATO’s rules and commitments will likely need reform toward a more flexible, libertarian-style arrangement without automatic binding defense obligations. Russia is highly unlikely to attack the Baltic states, despite warnings from Zelensky aimed at securing more Western aid. The Baltic states were historically part of the Russian sphere before 1917 (acquired after Sweden’s defeat in the Great Northern War), yet they are small, difficult to hold in modern war without massive destruction, and not economically essential to Russia.

Nations ultimately thrive better through peace and prosperity than through endless military conflict. Ukraine could reasonably be divided into two viable states with open borders, special lifetime visas for citizens on both sides, and liberal trade policies. With normal economic relations, the main differences would be taxes and local elections. Healthy competition between the two could even drive progress.