President Trump is said to be negotiating with Iran about the Persian Gulf and International Law of the Sea. Iran and Oman are colluding to control the Strait and impose taxes/fees on ships passing. President Trump cannot agree with any part of that any more than he could agree with Britain, Spain or Morocco to tax/charge fees on all ships passing the Strait of Gibralter.
Plainly Oman will need to be administered by a regional, international body in the future- perhaps Saudi Arabia, the United States, Israel, Kuwait and the U.A.E. to assure the Strait of Hormuz remains free. Omanis could continue to regulate their own affairs except for those concerning international shipping. It may become necessary for Iran as well to permanently lose territory on the Strait of Hormuz for coalition security forces. A 99 year mission with territorial sovereignty should be given to the Strait of Hormuz Defense Governance Coalition.
Iran is obviously counting on the U.S. record playbook of leaving conflicts eventually that they do not win- from Vietnam to Afghanistan U.S. leadership tends to leave or look for quicky deals on bad terms if the opposition force resists long enough. The Strait of Hormuz should be different though. Even if oil flows stop through that waterway five or ten years the Law of the Sea should be defended globally.
I interacted with AI discussing various relevant issue concerning the Oran war.
Gary– Aren’t Iranian attacks on Persian Gulf travelling oil tankers comparable to the piracy of Somalia?
A.I.-While political figures have compared Iran’s state-backed maritime obstructions to Somali piracy, the actions differ fundamentally. Somali piracy is criminal and decentralized, driven by financial ransoms. Iranian tanker seizures are state-directed geopolitical actions carried out by military forces in uniform, resembling state-level coercion or reprisal rather than traditional piracy. [1, 2, 3, 4, 5]
Nature of the Actors
- Somali Pirates: Independent criminal gangs and local militias operating without state backing.
- Iran: Regular military and paramilitary forces, like the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), acting under official government policy. [6, 7]
Core Motivations
- Somali Piracy: Extortion of private commercial companies for multimillion-dollar cash ransoms.
- Iran Actions: Retaliation for international sanctions, geopolitical leverage, or seizing cargo in response to legal disputes involving detained Iranian ships. [2, 3]
Legal and Diplomatic Classifications
- Piracy: Defined under international law (UNCLOS) as private acts of violence or detention committed for private ends.
- State Seizure: Sovereign actions or boardings conducted by a recognized government, governed by the laws of state responsibility and armed conflict rather than maritime criminal law. [8, 9]
Would you like to explore how international maritime law differentiates state actions from criminal piracy, or look into recent security developments in the Strait of Hormuz?
[9] https://www.mol-service.com
Gary– It’s a rather interesting opportunity to compare state terrorism to private terrorism, individual terrorism, or organized crime brought to a state level. And to compare that with organized crime by non-state actors. I think that one could compare reasonably organized crime in the Gaza Strip and organized crime in Yemen and organized crime in Iran with general all-purpose terrorism. Besides, one might even go to the point and say that attacking oil tankers anywhere in the world is terrorism and piracy.
AI– Comparing state-level coercion to non-state organized crime and terrorism highlights a central debate in modern international relations, where academic definitions often clash with public perceptions. Legal frameworks and political analysts categorize these actions based on who commits them, why they do it, and what laws apply.
Definitions and Categories
- State Actions (Iran, Yemen’s Houthis):
- Iran operates through official military branches like the IRGC to enforce geopolitical leverage.
- Yemen’s Houthi movement, while acting as a de facto government in parts of Yemen, functions as a heavily armed militant group backed by a state sponsor (Iran).
- These actions are typically classified as state-sponsored terrorism, asymmetric warfare, or violations of state responsibility under international law. [1, 2, 3, 4, 5]
- Non-State De Facto Control (Gaza Strip):
- Groups operating in Gaza have historically combined governance with militant operations.
- When such groups target civilian infrastructure or commercial shipping, international bodies and sovereign states classify these actions as terrorism rather than localized organized crime due to their political and ideological goals.
- Non-State Private Actors (Somali Pirates):
Overlapping Tactics vs. Different Objectives
| Feature | State-Level Coercion (e.g., Iran) | State-Backed Militancy (e.g., Houthis) | Private Organized Crime (e.g., Somalia) |
| Primary Actor | Uniformed military / State institutions | De facto authorities / Insurgent groups | Criminal syndicates / Local militias |
| Main Objective | Geopolitical leverage, sanctions relief, deterrence [1, 2] | Ideological warfare, regional disruption | Financial gain via ransom and extortion |
| Legal Regime | Laws of Armed Conflict / State Responsibility | Counter-terrorism frameworks / Sanctions | Domestic criminal law / Maritime piracy law |
| Command Structure | Centralized national command | Decentralized but state-coordinated | Fluid, clan-based criminal networks |
The “Global Terrorism” vs. Piracy Argument
The argument that attacking oil tankers is inherently “terrorism and piracy” regardless of who does it aligns with a philosophical view of global security, but faces specific legal boundaries:
- The Hostis Humani Generis Principle: Historically, pirates were declared hostis humani generis (enemies of all mankind), allowing any nation to capture and try them. [1, 2, 3]
- The Political Boundary: When a sovereign state or a politically motivated group attacks a ship, international law shifts the response from a criminal law enforcement matter to a geopolitical or military conflict. Nations respond with naval escorts, economic sanctions, or military strikes rather than police arrests.
If you would like to look deeper into this, we can examine how international courts handle state-sponsored maritime property destruction, or look at the financial networks that fund these different groups. [1]
Gary– I believe it might be useful to compare taxation without representation to legal jurisprudence without representation as well as consider extortion circumstances like regular organized crime- extortion perhaps the five families in New York of of the 60s with that of extortion by Iran over the Strait of Hormuz and shipping to extort money from shippers going through an international waterway.
AI- Comparing historical organized crime extortion to the state actions of Iran in the Strait of Hormuz highlights how similar tactics—restricting access, demanding compliance, and threatening force—serve entirely different strategic goals. The concept of “jurisprudence without representation” further mirrors this dynamic, describing systems where rules are imposed on actors who have no voice in making them.
Extortion: New York’s Five Families vs. Iran
While both systems rely on the implicit or explicit threat of violence to extract value, their structure, mechanisms, and goals diverge significantly.
- The Mafia (Private Extortion):
- The Mechanism: The Five Families used the “protection racket.” Businesses paid a tax to avoid property damage or physical harm from the Mafia itself, or to operate in a specific territory.
- The Goal: Purely financial. The revenue directly enriched individuals and sustained a hidden, illegal corporate structure operating entirely outside the law.
- The Scope: Localized and parasitic, relying on the quiet complicity or fear of local businesses and corrupt officials.
- Iran (State-Level Coercion):
- The Mechanism: Iran utilizes its geographic positioning over the Strait of Hormuz—a vital global choke point—to board, detain, or harass commercial vessels.
- The Goal: Geopolitical leverage rather than direct financial profit. These actions are typically executed to force the release of seized Iranian oil tankers abroad, pressure Western nations for sanctions relief, or signal deterrence during diplomatic standoffs.
- The Scope: International and sovereign. The actions are carried out openly by uniformed state militaries (the IRGC) operating under national strategic policies. [1, 2, 3, 4, 5]
Jurisprudence Without Representation
Your phrase “jurisprudence without representation” provides a strong framework for understanding the friction in both scenarios. It describes a legal or regulatory system imposed on a population or group that has no political input or voting power within that system.
- In Organized Crime: The Mafia establishes its own unwritten legal code (Omertà, territorial boundaries, dispute tribunals). Legitimate business owners subjected to their extortion must follow these rules but have zero representation or recourse within the criminal hierarchy.
- In International Maritime Channels: This friction occurs when a coastal state imposes strict, non-standard domestic laws or aggressive military oversight on international shipping lanes. Commercial vessels flying foreign flags must navigate these rules to avoid seizure, yet the global shipping industry and foreign citizens have no political representation or legislative say within the governing state’s legal structure.
If you want to explore this comparison further, we can look at how international transit rights under UNCLOS try to prevent local overreach, or analyze the historical economics of protection rackets compared to the economic fallout of modern maritime security crises.
Gary- Is it even possible for President Trump to negotiate Law of the Sea of the Persian Gulf with Iran in a way that would concede any law of the sea freedom- impinging international shipping?
AI- President Trump cannot legally alter global freedom of navigation via a bilateral deal with Iran, but his administration could make political concessions that fundamentally compromise international shipping access. Because both the United States and Iran are notably non-parties to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), the current diplomatic standoff over the ongoing 2026 war hinges on customary international law versus raw military leverage. [1, 2, 3]
1. The Legal Reality: No Bilateral Power to Change Global Law
- No Third-Party Binding: A pact between the U.S. and Iran cannot legally rewrite international maritime law for other sovereign nations. Legal experts note that a bilateral agreement modifying transit rights would not bind third states like European or Asian trading partners. [2]
- The Role of Oman: The southern half of the Strait of Hormuz belongs to Oman’s territorial waters. Unlike the U.S. and Iran, Oman is an UNCLOS party bound by international “transit passage” rules. Any arrangement attempting to restrict freedom of travel would face direct conflict with Oman’s obligations. [1, 2, 4, 5, 6]
2. The Geopolitical Friction: De Facto Concessions vs. Law
While President Trump cannot change the law itself, critics and legal scholars warn that a negotiated “compromise” to end the conflict could establish dangerous precedents. Recent draft proposals in negotiation reveal the precise mechanisms of this friction: [2, 7, 8, 9]
- The Routing Demands: Iran is currently pushing for a framework where ships must enter the Persian Gulf via an Iranian-controlled route. This is being compared to a “visa system” requiring transit permissions, which directly curtails the concept of unimpeded international transit. [9, 10, 11]
- Transit Fees: Tehran has demanded the right to charge service fees for “security and environmental preservation”. Legal scholars argue that paying a state to guarantee safe passage through an international waterway is effectively a formalized protection racket or extortion dressed up as local regulation. [2, 9, 12, 13]
- The Trump Administration Position: While Trump has publicly dismissed Iran’s toll concepts by boasting of absolute U.S. naval dominance, the pressure to stabilize global oil markets and conclude an unpopular war ahead of domestic elections has kept a negotiated solution on the table. [8, 9, 14]
3. Why This Matters for Global Shipping
If the Trump administration yields to a compromise that permits Iranian oversight or transit notifications, it would signal a major departure from decades of U.S. foreign policy. Even if framed as a temporary ceasefire arrangement, allowing a coastal state to selectively manage or condition passage through a global chokepoint risks fragmenting the international rules-based order. [2, 7, 8, 15, 16]
[1] https://www.unclosdebate.org
[5] https://www.thedailystar.net
[6] https://www.lawfaremedia.org
[11] https://www.techtimes.com
[15] https://www.pbs.org
Gary- Realistically president Trump can only negotiate Iranian surrender of nuclear weapons development/ nuclear program that can lead to nuclear weapons- and not the freedom of international shipping of the Persian Gulf or anywhere else?
AI- Realistically, President Trump can—and currently is—negotiating both issues, but they are deliberately split into two separate phases. Under the administration’s two-step framework for ending the war, maritime security in the Strait of Hormuz is the immediate priority, while denuclearization is the secondary, long-term goal. [1, 2]
The Two-Phase Negotiation Strategy
The White House has separated the crisis into distinct diplomatic tracks to break the stalemate:
- Phase 1: The Maritime Deal (Current Focus): Trump explicitly stated that the first phase focuses on reopening the Strait of Hormuz to normalize global commerce. U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent and Secretary of State Marco Rubio confirmed that this short-term track aims to restore the “freedom of movement” for oil tankers and commercial ships. [2, 3, 4, 5]
- Phase 2: The Nuclear Deal (Long-Term Goal): Trump noted that “the second phase will be the denuclearization,” emphasizing that the broader geopolitical settlement will require Iran to permanently forfeit any path to a nuclear weapon. [2]
The Core Conflict: What is Being Conceded?
While Trump is negotiating shipping rights, the critical debate is whether the U.S. will hold its red line or concede traditional maritime freedoms to secure a ceasefire: [6, 7, 8]
- The U.S. Red Line: The administration maintains that it wants total freedom of navigation with zero Iranian tolls, lane control, or transit permissions. Trump has publicly rejected Iran’s demands to charge service fees, stating, “I’m not going to let them charge.” [1, 9, 10]
- The Looming Compromise: Despite the tough rhetoric, current draft proposals mediated through Oman reveal that Iran is pushing for structural control over inbound shipping routes. Critics warn that if the U.S. accepts a temporary fix to lower global gas prices, it could inadvertently de facto legalize the very restrictions on shipping freedoms the U.S. military has historically fought to prevent. [6, 11, 12, 13]
[8] https://takshashila.org.in
[10] https://www.aljazeera.com
[11] https://www.cnbc.com
[12] https://www.wdsu.com
[13] https://www.fdd.org
Gary– In a sense president Trump has his negotiating priorities backwards; his first priority and his only legitimate priority is that of the nuclear weapons issue while the Persian Gulf issue is simply a matter of the United States will blast you around to the Stone Age if they keep trying to extort Persian Gulf shippers with military attacks?
AI- The argument that President Trump has his priorities backwards highlights a major split between traditional military deterrence and pragmatic economic diplomacy. Many security analysts agree with your perspective, arguing that treating freedom of navigation as a negotiable item—rather than an absolute red line enforced by military dominance—weakens global stability. [1]
Evaluating the two competing strategic views reveals why this prioritization is so heavily debated. [2]
The Argument for Your View: “Deterrence First, Denuclearization Only”
This perspective argues that freedom of navigation is non-negotiable and should be enforced strictly through military power, not diplomatic compromise. [3]
- Absolute Maritime Freedom: Historically, the U.S. position has been that international waterways are open by right, not by permission. Under this view, negotiating shipping lanes or notifications with Iran concedes that Iran has a right to dictate terms, effectively legitimizing their extortion tactics. [4]
- The “Stone Age” Deterrence: Proponents of this view argue that the U.S. Navy possesses the overwhelming firepower required to destroy the IRGC’s naval capabilities, clear mines, and escort tankers unilaterally. Using military force to secure the Gulf would send a clear signal that maritime extortion will not be tolerated. [5]
- The Existential Threat: This logic dictates that the only issue requiring deep diplomatic negotiation is the nuclear program, as a nuclear-armed Iran presents a permanent, existential shift in global power that conventional military strikes cannot easily permanently erase. [6]
The Administration’s Counter-View: “Economic Urgency First”
The Trump administration’s decision to prioritize a maritime ceasefire stems from immediate domestic and global economic pressures rather than long-term legal philosophy.
- Immediate Inflation and Energy Shock: Ongoing military conflicts in the Gulf disrupt global oil supplies, spiking inflation and energy costs. For an administration highly focused on domestic economic metrics and gas prices, stabilizing the markets immediately is treated as a political necessity that cannot wait for a lengthy nuclear negotiation. [7, 8, 9, 10, 11]
- Avoiding a Wider Regional War: While a massive U.S. military campaign could crush Iran’s conventional navy, it risks triggering a massive, unpredictable regional war. Iran can deploy asymmetric warfare, including ballistic missile strikes on regional oil infrastructure (like Saudi Arabia’s Abqaiq) and drone attacks on U.S. bases, which could inflict severe damage on the global economy. [12, 13, 14, 15, 16]
- Using Leverage Sequentially: The administration’s tactical gamble is that stopping the immediate fighting in the Gulf lowers the temperature and establishes a diplomatic channel, which can then be leveraged into a stricter “maximum pressure” negotiation over the nuclear program later. [17]
Ultimately, the friction in Trump’s strategy is the classic dilemma of short-term stabilization versus long-term deterrence. By putting the maritime issue on the negotiating table to secure a quick economic win, the administration risks signaling that global shipping rights can be bartered, which critics worry could invite further extortion from hostile states down the road. [18]
If you would like to examine this further, we can look at how past U.S. naval operations (like Operation Earnest Will in the 1980s) used direct military force to secure the Gulf, or analyze the current economic impact of the shipping disruptions on global trade. [19, 20]
[1] https://www.automotivelogistics.media
[7] https://www.latrobe.edu.au
[10] https://blogs.timesofisrael.com
[15] https://www.tasnimnews.ir
[18] https://iveybusinessjournal.com
Garrison Gibson: books and blog 
Leave a comment