Laws stand a better chance of being just when they are made with consent of the governed with a polity. Laws internationally reflect the values of a power majority. The EU these days is assertive about its newish union. They believe laws fairly disregard tribal and cultural reality in preference for homogenized paper values. For atheists the extirpation of a global minority religion would be trivial.

Leftists have sought to convict Israel of genocide in the Gaza. I won’t examine that paradigm here. I wanted to comment that genocide doesn’t mean what people believe it does in popular thought. Rather than attempting to exterminate a race as the Germans did the Jews during the Second World War, the charge requires something far less- a sort of ethnic cleansing within a nation is sufficient. There is more of that description below in the AI commentary.

I find the timing of the decision curious- it follows the sweeping victory of Democrats in the U.S.A. The European centered World Court of Justice may expect to have sympathetic fellow travellers in Congress. Hillary Clinton recently said that the leader of the free world may be P.M. Carney of Canada. Transnational loyalties are a thing with Democrats the past few decades.

Between 10,000 and 24,000 Rohingya muslims were killed during the troubles in the former Burma. Myanmar shares a border with 100 million Muslims next door in Bangladesh, and that fact is what the Myanmar military government views as an existential threat- that is having an internal proletariat of Muslims adjacent to an external proletariat of 100 million. Communist revolutionary leaders Mao Zedong regarded the people as a sea in which revolutionary fish could swim. Drying up the pond was the nature of Myanmar’s culling of the Rohingyas. In my opinion the Myanmar government perpetrated democide rather than genocide. Accuracy matters in historical labels.

Gary– What is the population of Rohingyas and what is the difference between a Rohingyan and a Bangladeshi; is there a big difference?

AI– The global Rohingya population is estimated at roughly 2.5 to 3 million people, with the largest share living as stateless refugees in Bangladesh. While Rohingya and Bangladeshis share close historical, religious, and linguistic roots, they are distinct groups separated by centuries of separate regional history, nationality, and identity. [1, 2, 3, 4]

Global Rohingya Population

Because the Rohingya are stateless and widely displaced, exact global census figures do not exist, though UN agencies and demographic monitors track the major populations across the region:

  • Bangladesh. According to UNHCR Bangladesh data, over 1.2 million registered Rohingya refugees live in Bangladesh. Most reside in the Cox’s Bazar refugee camps, with around 33,000 relocated to Bhashan Char island. [1, 2]
  • Myanmar. Roughly 400,000 to 600,000 Rohingya remain inside Myanmar’s Rakhine State. More than 100,000 of them are confined to internal displacement camps with severe restrictions on their movement. [1, 2]
  • Global Diaspora. Hundreds of thousands more live across South Asia, Southeast Asia, and the Middle East. Major diaspora communities include Saudi Arabia (roughly 400,000 to 500,000), Pakistan (around 350,000), Malaysia (over 100,000), and India (roughly 40,000). [1]

Rohingya vs. Bangladeshi: Key Differences

Whether there is a “big difference” depends on whether you look at cultural similarities or legal and historical identity. While they share a border and many cultural traits, they do not consider themselves the same people. [1, 2]

Feature [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7]RohingyaBangladeshi
Homeland & NationalityIndigenous to the Arakan region (Rakhine State) in western Myanmar. They are currently stateless.Citizens of Bangladesh, an independent nation in South Asia.
LanguageSpeak Rohingya (Ruáingga), an Indo-Aryan language with vocabulary from Burmese, Rakhine, Arabic, and Urdu.Speak Bengali (Bangla) as the national language. People in southeastern Bangladesh speak the Chittagonian dialect.
Mutual IntelligibilityCannot easily understand standard Bengali. Can largely understand Chittagonian speakers from southern Bangladesh, though differences cause misunderstandings.Standard Bengali speakers generally cannot understand Rohingya without translation.
Historical IdentityShaped by centuries under the Kingdom of Arakan and later British and Burmese rule.Shaped by the history of Bengal, the 1947 Partition of India, and the 1971 Liberation War from Pakistan.
Religion & CulturePredominantly Sunni Muslim, with social customs influenced by both South Asian and Southeast Asian (Burmese/Rakhine) traditions.Predominantly Sunni Muslim (about 90%), alongside a significant Hindu minority, rooted in broader Bengali culture.

Why the Distinction Matters Politically

The difference between Rohingya and Bangladeshi is at the center of the crisis in Myanmar: [1, 2]

  • Myanmar’s Denial of Citizenship. The Myanmar government refuses to use the name “Rohingya” and labels them “Bengalis”. By calling them Bengali, Myanmar authorities claim the Rohingya are recent illegal immigrants from Bangladesh rather than a native ethnic group of Myanmar. [1, 2]
  • Bangladesh’s Position. Bangladesh also views the Rohingya as a separate people belonging to Myanmar. While Bangladesh hosts over a million refugees on humanitarian grounds, it classifies them as “Forcibly Displaced Myanmar Nationals” rather than Bangladeshi citizens. [1, 2]

Gary– Aren’t the Rohingya a military threat to the Buddhist Myanmar people because they are Muslim just like the Bangladeshis and so a problem for state security in Myanmar?

AI– Whether the Rohingya pose a military or state security threat to Myanmar is a central point of contention between Myanmar’s military leaders, international legal bodies, and security analysts.

According to Myanmar’s military authorities, strict security measures and military operations were necessary to counter armed Rohingya insurgents and protect national sovereignty. Conversely, the United Nations, the International Court of Justice (ICJ), and independent security researchers maintain that the Rohingya civilian population does not pose a military threat to Myanmar and that security concerns were used as a pretext for mass atrocities.

Myanmar’s State Security Argument

Myanmar’s military (the Tatmadaw) and nationalist groups have long framed the Rohingya population as an existential threat to the country’s security and Buddhist-majority identity:

  • Insurgent Attacks. Myanmar authorities point to attacks by the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA)—specifically coordinated raids on border police posts in October 2016 and August 2017 that killed dozens of security personnel—as direct evidence of a militant threat.
  • Demographic and Sovereignty Fears. Military leaders and nationalist figures have argued that a growing Muslim population in Rakhine State, bordering Muslim-majority Bangladesh, could lead to territorial secession or Islamist extremism. Under this view, restricting Rohingya citizenship and movement was framed as defending national sovereignty.

Assessments from International Courts and Security Analysts

International courts, UN investigators, and conflict analysts strongly reject the claim that the Rohingya population represents a viable military threat to the Myanmar state:

  • ICJ and UN Findings on Proportionality. In its November 2026 genocide ruling, the International Court of Justice and earlier UN Fact-Finding Missions concluded that Myanmar’s military response was completely disproportionate to any security threat posed by ARSA. Investigators found that the military targeted unarmed civilians, burned hundreds of villages, and committed mass killings rather than conducting targeted counter-insurgency operations.
  • Military Imbalance. Security analysts at organizations like the International Crisis Group note that ARSA was a poorly equipped group armed primarily with knives, homemade explosives, and a small number of captured rifles. In contrast, the Myanmar military is a heavily armed national force with hundreds of thousands of troops, artillery, and air power.
  • Lack of External Backing. Researchers emphasize that neither Bangladesh nor international militant networks have armed or backed a Rohingya insurgency against Myanmar. Bangladesh has consistently sought the peaceful repatriation of refugees rather than territorial expansion or conflict with Myanmar.
  • Current Dynamics in Rakhine State. In recent years, the primary military challenge to Myanmar’s junta in Rakhine State has come from the Arakan Army (AA)—an ethnic Rakhine Buddhist insurgent group—rather than the Rohingya. Ironically, during recent fighting, Myanmar’s military forcibly conscripted thousands of Rohingya men to fight against the Arakan Army, while some small Rohingya militant factions also clashed with the AA.

If you’d like to explore this further, we can look into:

The origins and current role of ARSA and other armed groups in Rakhine StateHow the Arakan Army’s recent territorial gains have affected both the Myanmar military and Rohingya civilians

Gary– I think it’s Bangladesh that is the military threat; it’s obvious that they’re an external proletariat and the rohingyas are an internal proletariat but I think the genocide charge in the UN is inaccurate- they didn’t even remotely try that; they’re trying to sanitize Myanmar borders.

AI– Perspectives on the conflict in Rakhine State, the role of Bangladesh, and the legal validity of the United Nations genocide ruling differ sharply depending on whether one adopts nationalist security theories, Toynbee-style civilizational frameworks, or international legal standards.

1. The “External and Internal Proletariat” Perspective

Your framing draws on historian Arnold Toynbee’s theory of civilizations, which describes how dominant societies feel threatened by an “internal proletariat” (a marginalized group within its borders) aligning with an “external proletariat” (neighboring populations outside its borders).

  • Alignment with Myanmar Nationalist Views. Myanmar’s military and nationalist thinkers have frequently echoed similar ideas. They portray Rakhine State as a vulnerable civilizational frontier between Buddhist Southeast Asia and Muslim South Asia, arguing that demographic shifts and border permeability pose an existential threat to Myanmar’s cultural and territorial integrity.
  • Critique from Historians and Analysts. Independent historians and regional analysts argue that applying this model oversimplifies Rakhine State’s history. They point out that Muslim communities lived in the region for centuries before modern borders existed, and that the Rohingya have not acted as a unified fifth column for Bangladesh.

2. Is Bangladesh a Military Threat to Myanmar?

Military analysts and regional security organizations, including the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), generally assess that Bangladesh does not pose an offensive military threat to Myanmar, though border tensions do exist.

  • Military Doctrine and Posture. Bangladesh’s armed forces are structured primarily for territorial defense and UN peacekeeping rather than cross-border invasion. Despite hosting over 1.2 million refugees since 2017—and enduring stray mortar shells and airspace violations from Myanmar’s internal civil war—Dhaka has consistently avoided military retaliation, relying instead on diplomacy and international courts.
  • Bangladesh’s Internal Pressures. Far from seeking to annex territory or project power into Myanmar, Bangladeshi officials view the refugee crisis as a severe economic, environmental, and security burden on their own country.

3. Debate Over the UN and ICJ Genocide Ruling

The International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruling on November 19, 2026, which found Myanmar responsible for genocide, has generated strong legal and political debate.

  • Arguments Supporting the Genocide Finding. Under the 1948 UN Genocide Convention, genocide is defined not only by total extermination, but by specific acts—such as killing, causing serious bodily or mental harm, and inflicting destructive living conditions—committed with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial, or religious group. In its 9-to-6 decision, the ICJ majority ruled that the scale of village burnings, mass killings, sexual violence, and forced expulsion of over 700,000 people met this legal threshold.
  • Arguments Criticizing the Ruling. Critics of the ruling—including Myanmar’s military government and the six dissenting ICJ judges—argue that the court set too low a bar for proving “genocidal intent.” Dissenting opinions and skeptics contend that while brutal war crimes and crimes against humanity occurred during counter-insurgency operations, the primary goal was clearing border areas of perceived security threats or forcing migration, rather than physically destroying the Rohingya as a biological group. From this perspective, labeling the campaign “genocide” stretches the legal definition for political purposes.

If you would like to examine the legal details further, I can summarize the specific arguments made by the six dissenting ICJ judges or look at how Myanmar’s military government has responded to the ruling. Which would you prefer?

Gary– I believe the decision is wrong- and I don’t doubt for a minute that the rohegans actually lived there but in the modern context of all that Muslim terrorism and restiveness in the world generally especially with Sunni it’s obvious that Myanmar rulers were anxious about security

AI- The role of global security anxieties and how they intersect with international law is a central theme in how different observers interpret the crisis in Myanmar.

1. Security Anxiety in Myanmar’s Domestic Context

Analysts who study Myanmar’s politics—such as researchers at the International Crisis Group and historians of modern Burma—acknowledge that widespread anxiety about global militancy strongly influenced public and military sentiment inside Myanmar:

  • Fear of Global Jihadist Networks. Following the rise of groups like al-Qaeda and ISIS globally, Myanmar’s military and nationalist movements—such as the Ma Ba Tha movement—actively linked local Rohingya militants to international Sunni extremism. When the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) launched attacks in 2016 and 2017, many people inside Myanmar genuinely feared that Rakhine State could become a foothold for foreign fighters or transnational terrorism.
  • Historical Siege Mentality. After decades of internal armed conflicts with various ethnic insurgencies since independence in 1948, Myanmar’s military institution developed a deeply entrenched siege mentality. From the military’s perspective, overwhelming force was viewed as the only reliable way to prevent territorial fragmentation.

2. Why International Law Rejects “Anxiety” as a Legal Defense

While historians and political scientists recognize that fear and security anxieties were real driving forces in Myanmar, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and legal scholars emphasize that international law draws a strict line between state security concerns and collective punishment:

  • No Exception for Security Threats. Under the 1948 UN Genocide Convention, perceived security threats, counter-insurgency goals, or fears of terrorism cannot legally justify targeting an entire civilian population based on its ethnic or religious identity. The court’s mandate is strictly to evaluate whether the state’s actions met the legal criteria of genocidal intent, regardless of the anxieties motivating its leaders.
  • Distinguishing Militants from Civilians. Security analysts point out that while ARSA had a small number of fighters, independent investigations by the United Nations found no evidence of widespread ISIS or al-Qaeda operational networks among the Rohingya population. Critics of Myanmar’s military argue that conflating hundreds of thousands of ordinary villagers—including women, children, and the elderly—with global terrorist networks turned legitimate counter-terrorism concerns into indiscriminate violence.

3. The Core Divide in Interpretation

Ultimately, the debate comes down to two fundamentally different frameworks for viewing the conflict:

  • The Realpolitik / Security Framework. Views states as acting out of existential fear in a dangerous world, where harsh, sweeping measures are seen as tragic or heavy-handed reactions to perceived demographic and militant threats.
  • The International Legal Framework. Evaluates state conduct against universal legal rules designed to protect civilian populations from mass atrocities, holding that collective punishment of an entire ethnic or religious group is never permissible.

Gary– When you consider how the Taliban destroyed the Buddha sculptures; I mean one sees obviously the clash of values between Muslims and Buddhists- even in Bangladesh westerners can’t hit on Bangladeshi women -it’s very strict.

AI– The connections you are drawing—linking events like the Taliban’s destruction of the Bamiyan Buddhas in Afghanistan, conservative social norms in Bangladesh, and the conflict in Myanmar—reflect a well-known geopolitical perspective often referred to as the “Clash of Civilizations” theory. However, historians, anthropologists, and regional experts generally view these events as driven by distinct local histories rather than a single, unified religious or cultural conflict.

1. The “Clash of Civilizations” Framework vs. Regional Diversity

Your perspective aligns closely with political scientist Samuel Huntington’s thesis that post-Cold War conflicts are driven primarily by broad cultural and religious fault lines rather than ideology or economics.

  • How the Argument Works. Proponents of this view point to militant iconoclasm (such as the Taliban dynamiting the Bamiyan Buddhas in 2001), conservative gender norms across parts of the Muslim world, and separatist movements in places like Kashmir, southern Thailand, and Myanmar as evidence of an inherent, irreconcilable friction between Islamic societies and Buddhist or Western societies.
  • The Counter-Perspective from Historians. Scholars of Asian history argue that treating “Muslims” or “Buddhists” as single, monolithic blocks obscures massive internal differences. For example, the Taliban follow a strict, fundamentalist interpretation of Islam rooted in Pashtun tribal codes and decades of war in Afghanistan, whereas Bangladesh is a constitutional republic with a secular legal foundation, a massive garment workforce dominated by women, and a history of fighting against Islamist political parties during its 1971 war of independence.

2. Social Conservatism vs. Militancy

Regarding social norms in countries like Bangladesh—such as conservative expectations around dating and gender interactions—sociologists note a clear distinction between cultural conservatism and political militancy:

  • Cultural Norms. Conservative attitudes toward romance, family honor, and public interaction with foreigners are common across much of South Asia—including among Hindu, Buddhist, and Christian communities in India, Nepal, and Myanmar—not just among Muslims.
  • Distinction from Extremism. Researchers studying political violence emphasize that traditional or strict social customs do not automatically translate into support for armed separatism or terrorism. In Bangladesh, for instance, the government has actively cracked down on domestic extremist groups over the past two decades while maintaining traditional social norms.

3. Local Roots of the Conflict in Myanmar

Experts who study Myanmar—such as historians at the International Crisis Group—argue that the violence in Rakhine State was shaped far more by colonial borders, citizenship laws, and military politics than by global religious clashes:

  • Historical Coexistence. Before British colonial rule and the rise of modern ethnic nationalism in the 20th century, Buddhist kings of the Arakan Kingdom regularly employed Muslim advisors, poets, and soldiers, and issued coins with Islamic inscriptions alongside Buddhist symbols.
  • Political Instrument. Many analysts note that Myanmar’s military junta has historically used religious and ethnic fears to justify its hold on power and distract from economic struggles—similar to how it has fought decades-long wars against Christian minorities (such as the Kachin and Karen) and fellow Buddhist minorities (such as the Shan and Rakhine).

Your distinction between democide and genocide, along with the counter-insurgency concept of militants “swimming in a sea” of a sympathetic population, touches directly on the core debates in political science, military strategy, and international law.

1. “Democide” vs. “Genocide”

Your argument that Myanmar’s actions constitute democide rather than genocide is a recognized distinction in political science, originally coined by researcher R.J. Rummel:

  • What Democide Means. Rummel defined democide as the intentional killing of an unarmed or disarmed person by government agents acting in their authoritative capacity—which includes mass murder, forced expulsion resulting in death, and extrajudicial killings carried out for political, strategic, or security reasons.
  • Why Critics Prefer Democide or Ethnic Cleansing. Legal skeptics and political theorists who reject the genocide label argue that Myanmar’s military acted out of political and territorial motives—specifically, the desire to expel a minority population seen as disloyal or culturally incompatible—rather than an ideological drive to biologically exterminate the Rohingya people as an end in itself. From this viewpoint, calling it democide or ethnic cleansing accurately captures the state’s brutality without stretching the legal definition of genocide.
  • Why the Court Chose Genocide. Conversely, the International Court of Justice majority ruled that under the 1948 Genocide Convention, the motive (such as national security or demographic control) does not cancel out genocidal intent. In international law, if a state deliberately uses mass killing and destructive living conditions to permanently eliminate a distinct ethnic or religious group from a region “in whole or in part,” it meets the legal definition of genocide regardless of the strategic fear behind it.

2. The “Fish in the Sea” Counter-Insurgency Theory

The metaphor you used—an internal population providing a “pond” for militants to swim in—comes directly from Mao Zedong’s famous guerrilla warfare maxim that insurgents are the “fish” and the civilian population is the “sea.”

  • How Military Strategists Use It. Throughout modern history, armies facing insurgencies—from the British in Malaya to the French in Algeria and Myanmar’s military in Rakhine State—have operated on the belief that the fastest way to defeat guerrillas is to “drain the sea” by forcibly removing, interning, or expelling the entire civilian population that shares the insurgents’ ethnicity or religion.
  • The Counter-Insurgency Critique. Modern counter-insurgency scholars, such as those at the RAND Corporation, argue that “draining the sea” through collective punishment almost always backfires strategically. Instead of eliminating militancy, indiscriminate violence radicalizes moderate civilians, destroys any chance of local intelligence cooperation, and creates a permanent, aggrieved refugee population across the border that becomes far easier for extremist groups to recruit from than a settled community with a stake in peace.

3. Demographic Change and Cultural Friction

Political scientists who study multi-ethnic states—such as researchers at the Pew Research Center and conflict scholars like Donald Horowitz—recognize that rapid demographic shifts between groups with distinct religious or cultural norms frequently generate severe political anxiety and conflict.

  • Competing Approaches to Integration. States generally respond to these pressures in one of two ways: either through exclusion and expulsion (attempting to enforce cultural homogeneity by removing minorities, as Myanmar attempted) or through institutional accommodation (granting citizenship, legal protections, and local representation so minority populations develop loyalty to the state).
  • The Core Disagreement. Defenders of hardline nationalist policies argue that assimilation fails when cultural values are deeply divergent, making demographic containment necessary for social stability. Critics counter that denying citizenship and basic rights is precisely what prevents assimilation in the first place, turning peaceful residents into an alienated “internal proletariat.”

If you’d like to explore this further, we can look into how other multi-ethnic Asian nations (such as Malaysia or Singapore) have managed demographic and religious differences, or examine R.J. Rummel’s historical research on democide across the 20th century. Which direction would you prefer?

Leave a Reply

This site uses Akismet to reduce spam. Learn how your comment data is processed.